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Lorsqu’on veut juger de l’égalité entre les diverses classes d’un peuple, il faut 
toujours arriver à demander comment se font les mariages. C’est le fond de la 
chose. Une égalité, résultat de la nécessité, de la courtoisie, de la politique, peut 
exister en apparence et tromper l’œil. Mais lorsqu’on vient à vouloir mettre 
cette égalité en pratique pour l’union des familles, alors on met le doigt sur la 
blessure.
(A. De Tocqueville, Voyage en Amérique, V, Œuvres complètes, Paris 1957)
What more have I to tell? Well, this—that matters bear just as hardly upon the 
eldest son. Perhaps he has his Gretchen to whom his heart is bound; but he 
cannot marry her, for the reason that he has not yet amassed sufficient gulden. 
So, the pair wait on in a mood of sincere and virtuous expectation, and smil-
ingly deposit themselves in pawn the while. Gretchen’s cheeks grow sunken, 
and she begins to wither; until at last, after some twenty years, their substance 
has multiplied, and sufficient gulden have been honourably and virtuously 
accumulated. Then the “Fater” blesses his forty-year-old heir and the thirty-
five-year-old Gretchen with the sunken bosom and the scarlet nose; after which 
he bursts into tears, reads the pair a lesson on morality, and dies.
(F. Dostoyevsky, The Gambler, translated by C. J. Hogarth. Project Gutenberg 
EBook)
In this chapter we review the main theories of household and marriage 
systems, highlighting their inability to account for the astonishing 
variety of family and marriage patterns that characterized modern 
Italy. We propose a new interpretative framework, in which social 
reproduction is given pride of place as the main factor shaping marital 
behavior and household formation in the past. We test our theory by 
analyzing six populations in northern and central Italy, characterized 
by different ecological, economic, and social conditions. We use an 
event-history analysis approach to model the timing of marriage in the 
populations under study. The results confirm that coercion mattered 
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much more than Malthusian economic constraints. We conclude by 
suggesting a more general application of our approach to the study of 
marital behavior, family formation, and residential patterns in the past.
Introduction: Which Interpretative Framework for the Italian 
Conundrum?
In the clear-cut dichotomy between East and West established by John 
Hajnal in his two celebrated essays on marriage and family systems 
(1965, 1982), the position of Southern Europe represented a source of 
embarrassment and disturbance. Correspondingly students of South 
European family have been at odds with such an authoritative model 
that seemed to fit so badly with their data. Indeed one would not give 
up the plain elegance and linear functioning of the Hajnal model 
lightheartedly.1
In his 1965 essay, Hajnal admitted that one would probably find 
significant divergences from the European pattern of late marriage and 
high celibacy as long as one proceeded not only “eastward but on the 
southern edge of Europe as well” (Hajnal 1965: 103). In 1982, Hajnal 
stressed the surprising similarity of the joint household formation 
system of fifteenth-century Tuscany to that characterizing contempo-
rary India and China. While acknowledging that household formation 
systems in Southern Europe might diverge remarkably from the North-
west European rules, Hajnal argued that they remained “probably 
much more similar to the Northwest European systems than were the 
joint household systems.” Including Southern Europe in the European 
marriage pattern would therefore require some modifications to the 
distinctive Northwest European household formation system (Hajnal 
1982: 476). The works of Richard Smith and Peter Laslett seemed to 
confirm Hajnal’s hypotheses about Southern Europe. Inspired by the 
findings from the 1427 Tuscan catasto as well as by current anthropo-
logical and sociological literature, Smith (1981) and Laslett (1983a) out-
lined a peculiar “Mediterranean model” of marriage and family 
organization characterizing large areas of Southern Europe and surviv-
ing well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rooted in the 
widespread diffusion of the sharecropping system and in the cultural 
features typical of the Mediterranean society.
These articles by influential scholars of the Cambridge Group gave 
rise to a huge wave of studies on family systems in Southern Europe, 
aiming to test the validity and extension of the Mediterranean model. 
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The outcome was a generalized rebuttal of both the Mediterranean and 
the Northwestern model. It soon emerged that striking variability and 
combinations of family patterns at the regional and sub-regional levels 
characterized Southern Europe, which made any attempt to develop a 
common model for Southern Europe hardly meaningful (Reher 1991). 
Furthermore the basic mechanisms interconnecting age at marriage, 
neolocality, and life-cycle service lost most of the stringent necessity 
postulated by Hajnal: for instance, in many places, the prevalence of 
neolocal households went hand in hand with early marriage; else-
where, joint families were associated with late marriage and, surpris-
ingly, with the sporadic presence of servants. To make things more 
disconcerting, demographic analyses suggested that notwithstanding 
the peculiarity of its marriage patterns, the population growth in Italy 
was largely regulated through the nuptiality valve (Breschi 1990; 
Breschi et al. 1994; see also Fernihough 2012), not differently from 
Northwest Europe, though possibly not exactly in the Malthusian way 
described by Wrigley and Schofield (1981; Schofield 2000). Overall, 
after two decades of “industrious research” by students of family and 
marriage in Southern Europe aiming to assess the Hajnal hypothesis, 
“the dominant tendency has been to refute it rule by rule” (Viazzo 2005: 
162). Kertzer’s conclusions were even more drastic: it is “the whole 
enterprise of branding major areas of Europe as having a particular 
type of household system [which] is misleading.” Rather than restrict-
ing themselves to a few parameters in order to build very broad tax-
onomies, family historians should develop a more sophisticated 
approach that focuses on “the interplay of political economy, demog-
raphy, and culture” (Kertzer 1991a: 157).
Such awareness of the complexity of factors affecting marital behav-
ior and family patterns seemed particularly compelling in the Italian 
case. Introducing his 1984 book, Kertzer himself declared that “no 
generalization regarding family life and co-residence in Europe can be 
made until the Italian case is well understood” (Kertzer 1984: 8). Seven 
years later, however, he found that “modern Italy has become a burial 
ground for many of the most ambitious, and well-known, theories of 
household and marriage systems proposed by historians, sociologists, 
and demographers”: quite a discouraging statement to be found in the 
introduction to a book on the history of the Italian family (Kertzer 
1991b: 247). Notwithstanding the quantity and quality of the research 
work carried out in recent years, thus far no acceptable theory provid-
ing a general clue to understanding household and marriage systems 
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in Italy has emerged; rather, the target itself seems to have been aban-
doned and deemed impossible or scarcely meaningful.2
Before the studies of the Cambridge Group imposed a Malthusian 
view as the standard paradigm in the history of the European family, 
a different perspective inspired the work of ethnographers and anthro-
pologists on family structures and marriage systems in Southern 
Europe. Since the late 1950s, the family of Southern Italy was the battle-
field of scholars like Edward Banfield, John Davis, Sydel Silverman, 
and William Douglass, whose starting point was the relevance of family 
ties and values to the shaping of the individuals’ behavior. Banfield’s 
particularly controversial description of South Italy as pervaded by 
“amoral familism,” the vicious propensity to put family interests above 
any other ethical principle, vividly expresses the kinds of question 
moving the scholarly debate at the time. Though with contrasting con-
clusions, all the analyses relied on marriage patterns and living arrange-
ments to draw the boundaries between a civilized northern and central 
Italy and a backward society located in the “Deep South” and perme-
ated by “non-Western cultures.”3
In a much broader scope, but still with the purpose of drawing 
boundaries between different cultures, David Reher (1998) similarly 
considered the strength of family ties as a major feature distinguishing 
Northern and Southern Europe. Reher traced a “horizontal” line cross-
ing France somewhere in the center and separating Northwestern 
Europe (and North America as well) from Southern and Mediterra-
nean Europe. The northern countries are characterized by weak family 
ties: here individual independence is valued much more than group 
solidarity; intergenerational links between parents and children are 
severed early and definitively; and care for the weakest members is 
left to public welfare institutions. Contrastingly, in Southern–
Mediterranean Europe, family interests always come before individual 
aspirations; family solidarity is the main source of mutual support, 
while anything pertaining to the state is considered with defiance and 
suspicion—an attenuated version of the amoral familism; and kin ties 
are effective throughout the entire lifetime of an individual, maintain-
ing an uninterrupted link between generations. The marriage patterns 
and living arrangements reflect such contrasting attitudes, but they 
cannot be considered their main determinant. According to Reher 
(1998: 210), “these differences seem to have little to do with the classi-
cal types of familial organization existing in Europe.” Their origins 
should be sought in the opposite influences of the German world and 
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the late Roman civilization, a cultural disparity that was strengthened 
and deepened by the spread of the Reformation in the sixteenth 
century.
Alongside the Malthusian and anthropologic frameworks, a third 
interpretative perspective on nuptiality and family systems must be 
mentioned finally, which gives priority to political and social consid-
erations of economic and cultural constraints. In 1980, Ron Lesthaeghe 
criticized Wrigley’s idea that a Smithian “invisible hand” regulated the 
balance between population and resources through some mechanism 
of “unconscious rationality” (Wrigley 1978). He argued that in pretran-
sitional societies, such as historic Western Europe and contemporary 
sub-Saharan Africa, the elites were primarily concerned with the con-
tinuity of wealth distribution and the perpetuation of social disparities, 
and that these were achieved through a functional linkage between 
“appropriation of resources, patterns of social control, risk devolution, 
and demographic checks” (Lesthaeghe 1980: 527). In Africa, the pillars 
of male gerontocratic control over the younger generations were polyg-
yny, postpartum taboo, and the preeminence of kinship groups over 
conjugal units. In Europe, it was the “nuptiality valve” that was instru-
mental in the enforcement of demographic and social homeostasis by 
the ruling classes, securing them from a potentially disruptive prolif-
eration of the poor. Lesthaeghe did not suggest how the European elites 
succeeded in enforcing nuptiality restrictions on the poor. He made 
clear, however, that the nuptiality check was “directly beneficial for 
parents and that parents, more than the community, controlled the 
maintenance of the nuptiality check” (Lesthaeghe 1980: 533). However, 
such a shift from the societal level (social control) to the family level 
(parental control) leaves a gap in which one might be tempted to see 
an “invisible hand” at work again, albeit more of a Marxian than a 
Smithian kind: indeed, even if one assumes that poor parents were 
willing to enforce a nuptiality check on their children, it was the rich 
who would most enjoy the social benefits deriving from such an 
(unconscious) courtesy.
In a rather similar vein, Arthur Wolf and colleagues4 recently pro-
posed a new interpretative framework of the East–West divide, arguing 
that parental authority was the main organizing principle distinguish-
ing family patterns. In countries like China and Russia, dominated by 
a “state patriarchy” (i.e., a patriarchy supported by the state), parents 
had the right to exploit their children “not just as children but for all 
their natural lives,” hence the predominance of joint households and 
GLundh—Similarity in Difference
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
294 R. Derosas, M. Breschi, A. Fornasin, M. Manfredini, C. Munno
early and universal marriage, which maximized the human capital at 
the head’s disposal. On the contrary, a “property patriarchy” (i.e., a 
form of patriarchy based on property control) characterized Western 
countries, and parents could exploit their children only as long as they 
remained unmarried, hence the adoption of late and sporadic marriage, 
which prolonged parents’ control over their children. The diffusion of 
life-cycle service was due to the fact that in the West the state was more 
reliable regarding the enforcement of labor contracts than the support 
of parental authority. For Western parents, it was easier to deal with 
servants than with their own children (Engelen and Wolf 2005: 28–29). 
In Wolf’s view, this stress on the two different forms of parental author-
ity not only confirms Hajnal’s East–West cleavage but also provides a 
sounder explanation for it, leading “away from the Malthusian concern 
with the balance between population and resources to a more Marxian 
concern with forms of domination” (Chuang and Wolf 2005: 286). It 
also keeps clear of the culturalism5 intrinsic in the ethnographic debate 
of the 1950s as well as in Reher’s proposal.
When it comes to Italy, however, the usual problems emerge. Engelen 
and Wolf allowed that “local conditions may countermand the forces 
that produce the European/non-European contrast.” In the Italian case, 
such conditions were basically the sharecropping system, whereby 
“external constraints” obliged people to maintain joint households in 
order to maximize the farm output. Indeed, among Tuscan sharecrop-
pers, all the decisions about the composition of the household were 
subject to the landlord’s preventive approval. Marriage, in particular, 
was a matter of primary concern for the landlord, who exercised his 
control with the utmost attention and harshness, deciding who was to 
marry and when. Disobedience could cause the expulsion of the family 
from the farm, with the risk of a dramatic descent down the social 
ladder.6
In Engelen and Wolf’s opinion, “the household system of Italian 
sharecroppers was a mutant version of a simple household system,” 
while all the other social groups followed the northwestern pattern 
(Engelen and Wolf 2005: 22–23). Unfortunately, however, things were 
not that simple. The geographies of joint households and sharecrop-
ping did not overlap perfectly, and complex households characterized 
many other areas where farming was carried out on extensive scale 
though under different lease contracts. Sharecropping itself was any-
thing but a homogeneous system, and sharecropping practiced in the 
hilly areas of Tuscany differed substantially from that featuring the Po 
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lowlands of Emilia or the dry areas of Veneto (Giorgetti 1974). The 
organization of households varied accordingly.
Yet another aspect of the Italian exceptionalism, such as the substan-
tial absence of life-cycle service, remains to be explained. As far as Italy 
was fully part of the Western “property patriarchy,” why did Italian 
parents largely avoid resorting to hired servants like their northwestern 
counterparts? Was it because they enjoyed greater authority over their 
children, which made it more convenient to exploit them directly rather 
than resorting to hired labor, or should one look again for “cultural” 
reasons? Unfortunately, in the few lines they devoted to Italy, Engelen 
and Wolf did not delve into this issue. Nevertheless, it is a crucial one.
Finally, although parental authority was certainly preeminent, there 
were other sources of authority that could influence marital choices 
and living arrangements. The state and the Church (Goody 1983, 1998) 
were obviously two such authorities, though they were frequently in 
conflict with each other. At the local level, the city governments and 
the artisan guilds had their say on the marriages of their subjects, cur-
tailing those that were not properly supported (Crossick and Haupt 
1995: 88; Ehmer 1984; Head-König 1993; Kok 2005: 361–62; Lynch 1991; 
Ogilvie 1997; see also Fertig 2003 for a critical reassessment).
The kin group exercised its control too, quite importantly. Mitterauer 
and Sieder (1982: 134–38) argued that the influence of kin on individual 
behavior was larger among the upper classes and the families of farmers 
and artisans. According to Augustins (2002), different levels of kin rela-
tionships were involved as legitimizing principles of individual and 
family behaviors, depending on the kind of inheritance and succession 
to headship that were adopted. These were the household level, when 
there was one single heir and successor; the kinship level, when inheri-
tance and succession involved all the siblings in the same way; and the 
lineage level, when inheritance and succession concerned only male 
children. Gérard Delille (1985) and Giovanni Levi (1985) showed con-
vincingly how such principles worked in Italy and how powerful they 
were. They also demonstrated that kin constraints could operate in more 
sophisticated ways than those concerning individual living arrange-
ments. For instance, Delille found that in certain areas of the Kingdom 
of Naples, households were settled in quartiers lignagers (agnatic lineage 
quarters) where lineage properties were concentrated: marriages and 
the circulation of land through dowries and inheritances were organized 
in such a way as to keep the territorial cohesion of the neighborhood 
untouched. Interestingly, in other places in the same region a similar 
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system was based on female descent lineages. Delille explained the dif-
ference by referring to the environmental and economic features of the 
two areas: in the area of patrilineal lineages, agriculture was based on 
small wine- and olive-growing farms, women were excluded from 
inheritance, and female celibacy was high; matrilineal lineages charac-
terized an area of corn-growing farms, where females inherited land and 
married early, and male outmigration was frequent (Delille 1985; for 
similar contrasts in Austria, see Mitterauer 1995).
From Constraints to Coercion: Marriage and Social Reproduction
Though poorly fitting the many facets of the Italian peculiarity, the 
patriarchy theory has the advantage of switching the attention from 
the Malthusian constraints to nuptiality to the role of domination as 
the driving force shaping different family arrangements. Indeed one 
could hardly conceive of any family system, whether the Eastern or the 
Western type, without some form of coercion securing its regular func-
tioning by keeping marriage under control. Who was to marry whom, 
when, and how could not be left to individual choice.
Broadly speaking, it can be assumed that everyone, after reaching 
sexual maturity, desired to marry and would actually do so, if simply 
allowed to. Although such a claim may seem hardly tenable to contem-
porary eyes, it is much less so when one looks at past societies. Not-
withstanding the efforts of Malthus (who was himself married) to 
praise the advantages of celibacy on all rungs of the social ladder 
(Malthus 1826: 397–400), the marital condition was a privileged one, 
giving access to a variety of relevant benefits—at the sexual, emotional, 
economic, social, and political levels—that were inaccessible to most 
unmarried people (with the possible exception of a few small groups, 
such as the clergy and the élites, who could otherwise secure some of 
the benefits of conjugal status). It was marriage that gave men full 
membership of the community, and secured respectability, (relative) 
independence, and control over their own households and women 
(Laslett 1983b: 12, 101; Sabean 1990: 61; Wall 2010: 89). Correspondingly 
the lowest layers of society were predominantly constituted by unmar-
ried adults and elders (Crossick and Haupt 1995: 101; Hufton 1984; 
Laslett 1988; Sabean 1990: 456; Stavenuiter 1996; Wall 2007), whose 
presence was often perceived as a source of embarrassment and moral 
concern by local authorities (Accati 1998; Anderson 1984; Bennet and 
Filippini 1983; Bennet and Froide 1999; Froide 2005; McCants 1999; 
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Ogilvie 1997: 64; Palazzi 1990; Sabean 1990: 456; Zannini and Gazzi 
2003). The disadvantaged condition of the unmarried was also common 
to Asian societies (Skinner 1997: 83), and is sadly persisting in contem-
porary affluent economies (e.g., see Hoynes et al. 2006; Minkler and 
Stone 1985; Modin 2003; Siegenthaler 1996). Nowadays, however, non-
marital cohabitation and other living arrangements can provide fre-
quent surrogates for formal unions, but until the recent past, marriage 
represented the only viable solution, and definitely a desirable one, for 
the great majority of the populace.7
Consequently, if most people married quite late and some never 
married at all, as happened in Western Europe, this was because some 
constraints, or coercions, or a combination of the two, compelled them 
to endure a prolonged wait or made marriage downright inaccessible. 
What for? Hajnal cautiously restrained from pointing out a specific 
cause or set of causes fostering the spread of the distinctive Northwest 
European marriage pattern. He stressed, however, the economic con-
straints that were related to the diffusion of life-cycle service and the 
principle of neolocality in household formation. According to Lesthae-
ghe, the nuptiality valve was instead instrumental in social control, 
carried out through parental coercion. Also the patriarchy theory pro-
posed by Wolf and colleagues put forward the explanation of parental 
coercion, though this was mainly inspired by the economic exploitation 
of the younger generations.
Our own interpretation of nuptiality control and marriage patterns 
in pretransitional societies relies on the arguments outlined above, but 
we insert them into a different and more comprehensive framework. 
We do not exclude the weight of economic constraints on nuptiality 
and family formation; we instead restrict it to more specific and limited 
conditions than is usually the case: we assume that such constraints 
could not affect the rich and the poor, and the landed and the landless, 
in the same way. Also we admit that cultural values and shared norms 
could play a relevant role in shaping marital behaviors or fixing the 
nature of family relations, for instance, prompting the elites to assume 
some “exaggerated version of the European Marriage Pattern” (Lynch 
1991: 83) or securing lifelong maintenance of strong family ties, as in 
southern Italy. However, we argue that such values and norms were 
embedded in a set of power relations and coercive forces, which usually 
remained under cover—“l’interdit tue le désir d’avance” (Veyne 1978: 
61)—but were readily called into operation whenever such norms were 
violated. Finally, and most important, we agree with the view that 
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nuptiality was mainly governed by some form of domination, as sug-
gested by Lesthaeghe and Wolf, but think that its mechanisms and 
rationale should be better qualified. On the one hand, there were other 
sources of coercion to take into account, though the parental role was 
certainly predominant. On the other hand, we argue that nuptiality 
control was mainly inspired by the enforcement of social reproduction, 
rather than by social control and parental exploitation. Indeed both 
social control and parental exploitation can be included in the frame-
work of social reproduction, but the latter provides a broader issue that 
can better account for the universality of marriage controls in pretran-
sitional societies.
All societies tend to perpetuate themselves, maintaining their social, 
cultural, and institutional patterns throughout time. Smaller groups, 
such as households and families, aim to reproduce themselves too. 
Their concern is not only the prosecution of the lineage, the safeguard-
ing of economic assets (if any), and the maintenance of social standing 
and social capital. It also includes more basic and daily issues, such as 
the organization of the household as a work and consumption unit, the 
care for the elderly and the children, and all the other aspects concern-
ing the subsistence and survival of the household members in the short 
and medium terms. In all of this, marriage obviously played a funda-
mental role. As Bourdieu (1976: 122) put it, as “an institution that had 
a direct bearing on the improvement, conservation, or dissipation of a 
family’s material and symbolic capital, [marriage] was no doubt one of 
the mainstays of both the dynamic and the static elements of the entire 
social system.” Consequently it needed to be carefully controlled and 
regulated.
Some excellent studies highlight from an anthropological viewpoint 
the role of marriage in social reproduction in the past (see Claverie and 
Lamaison 1982; Delille 1985; Sabean 1990, 1998; Segalen 1991a, among 
the most notable). However, only scant attention has been paid to the 
demographic implications of the mechanisms and the polities inspired 
by social reproduction, highlighting how they affected such aspects as 
the age at marriage and the extension of celibacy.8 This chapter adopts 
a different and more restricted perspective. As demographers, we focus 
on the probability of marrying, and ask whether and how access to 
marriage was determined by the requirements of social reproduction.
We argue that only referring to the variety of constraints imposed 
by social reproduction at the community, household, and individual 
levels a thorough understanding of the Italian conundrum can be 
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reached. We agree with Mitterauers’s suggestion that much of the vari-
ation in family arrangements was related to the peculiarities of eco-
types associated with specific modes of production (Mitterauer 1995; 
see also, with specific reference to Italy, Kertzer 2002). To take such 
peculiarities into account, our study includes six populations display-
ing a wide range of different social, economic, and environmental set-
tings, which can be representative, to some extent at least, of the 
complexity of Italian society. However, we were not interested in 
drawing a map of the Italian marriage patterns. Our approach was not 
aggregate but micro-analytical. Although we ran separate analyses for 
each population, we focused on individuals rather than on regions or 
macro-areas. Our purpose was to highlight several factors that we sup-
posed could influence the individual probability of marrying, deter-
mining whether they changed according to local peculiarities. Such 
factors include the economic conjuncture, the socioeconomic status of 
the household, the composition of the family with regard to the paren-
tal couple and the presence of siblings, the amount of social capital 
available, and the strength of the relationship with the local commu-
nity. Some of them refer to external constraints, others to forms of 
coercion conditioning individual access to marriage, but they all fit into 
a framework referring to social reproduction.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section three, we 
outline the main features of marriage and family systems in Italy from 
an aggregate point of view. Section four describes the populations that 
are part of our study and provides some descriptive analyses of nup-
tiality. In section five, we turn to a multivariate analysis of first mar-
riage in the populations under study. Section six discusses the results, 
while section seven is devoted to the conclusions.
Nuptiality in Late-Nineteenth-Century Italy: An Aggregate 
Overview
Kertzer’s definition of Italy as the graveyard of family theories is well 
grounded. If one considers the main constituents of family systems, 
such as the age at marriage, proportions married, rules of family forma-
tion, household structures, inheritance rules, and presence of life-cycle 
service, they combine in a variety of ways to contradict the most 
popular models developed by social scientists. There are regions 
(Puglia, in southern Italy) where neolocality is associated with early 
marriage, and regions (Tuscany) where patrilocality in complex 
GLundh—Similarity in Difference
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
300 R. Derosas, M. Breschi, A. Fornasin, M. Manfredini, C. Munno
households is associated with late marriage. Furthermore, not only do 
Tuscan farmers marry later than their counterparts in Puglia, but 
day laborers in the two regions demonstrate corresponding behavior 
(Rettaroli 1990). There are marked differences in family systems and 
nuptial behavior according to the ecological settings, agricultural orga-
nizations, social classes, juridical traditions, and local cultures. Family 
organization in the Alps differs from that prevailing in the flatland 
along the Po River, and both differ from the situation in the hills in 
central Italy (Viazzo and Albera 1990), let alone urban populations. In 
the Kingdom of Naples, the family strategies followed by grape- and 
olive-growers along the Tyrrhenian coast were opposite to those char-
acterizing corn farmers of the southern plains (Delille 1985).
Several factors contribute to such variability, including deep differ-
ences in the political regimes that ruled over the regional states of Italy 
in the centuries before the political unification in the 1860s. These 
regimes were grounded on specific socioeconomic structures and jurid-
ical systems, whose effects lasted long after a national kingdom was 
settled. Furthermore the great variety of ecological and economic con-
ditions influenced family systems and marriage patterns. Nevertheless, 
it seems worthwhile to provide a sketchy overview of nuptiality in 
late-nineteenth-century Italy, showing the main combinations and fea-
tures that can be detected at an aggregate level. The time period is later 
than that considered in our local studies, but unfortunately, no general 
analysis at the national level is possible before 1861 due to the lack of 
relevant data.
The picture emerging from the first censuses after unification sug-
gests substantial stability of nuptiality over the four census dates (table 
9.1): the age at marriage fluctuates at around 27 years for males and 23 
to 24 for females. The proportion of people who never married is about 
12 percent for both sexes, the drop in celibacy at the beginning of the 
new century probably being due to the massive outmigrations of 
the 1880s and 1890s (Rettaroli 1990). Such overall stability nevertheless 
conceals wide differences at the local level. For instance, in 1861 the 
average age at marriage of females ranged from 20.4 in Catania (Sicily) 
to 26.3 in Teramo (Abruzzo) and, as far as males are concerned, from 
24.7 years in Potenza (Basilicata) to 29.2 in Sondrio (Lombardy). The 
variability is even larger in the propensity to marry. Permanent celibacy 
for women ranged from 4.9 percent in Grosseto (Tuscany) to 22.6 
percent in the province of Catania. For men, the percentage ranged 
from 6.7 in Campobasso to 21 in the province of Naples.
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The 1881 census provides some pieces of information about the 
socioeconomic and demographic conditions at the provincial level, 
which can be used to highlight the relationship between marriage 
patterns, family systems, and structural characteristics of the rural 
economy. Resorting to cluster analysis, Cocchi et al. (1996) outlined 
seven main areas, characterized by some homogeneity of nuptiality 
patterns, which can also be useful for framing the features of the popu-
lations used for this study.
The first group concerns the Alpine area. Here marriages tended to 
be late, with high proportions of never-married people, especially 
women, who suffered from the imbalance in the marriage market 
(Lorenzetti and Merzario 2005; Viazzo 1989). Here barely half of the 
male workers were involved in agriculture, there was a widespread, 
small-scale pattern of landownership, and most households were 
nuclear.
A similar marriage pattern was also typical of the area of sharecrop-
ping farming predominating in most of central Italy (Tuscany, Marche, 
Umbria, and Romagna). The social and environmental context was, 
however, very different. Peasant landownership was rare, and farms 
were rented to tenant farmers or given to sharecroppers.
Early marriage featured in a limited area of the northwestern Italian 
lowlands. Tenant farming was predominant and involved one-third of 
the workforce permanently, while resorting to day laborers when the 
agricultural activity was most intense.
The large lowlands in Lombardy, Emilia, and Veneto were charac-
terized by slightly delayed and less universal access to marriage. The 
workforce was employed on large farms either run directly by the 
Table 9.1
Nuptiality indexes: Italy, 1861–1901
Year
Crude 
marriage 
rate
Percentage unmarried by age
Singulate mean 
age at marriage
Men Women Men Women
20–24 25–29 50–54 20–24 25–29 50–54    
1861 7.8 81.0 51.1 13.3 55.1 29.8 12.2 27.3 23.5
1871 7.4 83.0 50.0 12.5 54.8 28.6 12.3 27.3 23.3
1881 7.7 89.2 52.6 11.4 60.9 29.9 12.1 28.2 24.1
1901 7.2 87.0 49.0 10.9 60.3 29.7 10.9 27.7 24.1
Source: Italian Population Censuses.
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owners or rented out to tenants. Peasant landownership was negli-
gible. Large farms encouraged the formation of large, complex family 
units.
Central and southern Italy are divided into two groups, both char-
acterized by relatively early and widespread marriage. This is particu-
larly evident in the areas along the central ridge of the Apennines. This 
largely mountainous area presents a high proportion of land- or home-
owning residents, most of whom were males. Agricultural laborers 
outnumbered tenant farmers. Peasant property encouraged nuptiality, 
while unmarried males were increasingly obliged to migrate.
As for the other group of central and southern Italy, this was char-
acterized by the predominance of agricultural laborers. This large 
group includes scattered areas (the southern provinces of the Tuscan 
coastline, Latium, the coastal areas of Campania, Apulia, and most of 
Calabria and Sicily), justifying some variability in agricultural condi-
tions and nuptiality. The age at marriage and proportions married were 
close to the average Italian values. Households were mostly nuclear 
and concentrated in country towns rather than in dwellings scattered 
across the territory.
Finally, the last group comprises Sardinia. Here the family structure 
was predominantly nuclear, and the formation of the family corre-
sponded to the requirements, or ideals, of independent housing units 
and economic self-sufficiency. These aspirations explain the relatively 
advanced age at marriage, especially for men.
Population and Communities’ Context
This brief overview confirms both the diversity of family arrangements 
in nineteenth-century Italy and their relationship with the socioeco-
nomic conditions prevailing in different areas and environmental set-
tings. Such an aggregate approach, however, cannot extend beyond this 
general statement. Even in the same area, marital behaviors varied 
substantially with the socioeconomic conditions, and families of the 
same socioeconomic standing considered marriage differently accord-
ing to their specific situation, depending for instance on the age of the 
parents, the number of children eligible for marriage, or the current 
economic conjuncture. In order to understand how marital choices 
were molded to fit with the requirements of social reproduction at the 
household level, we now switch to a more analytic approach, which 
takes individual events and conditions into account.
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Period
Population
Source
1834–1867
1,100
Population registers
Treppo Carnico
Period
Population
Source
1780–1789
3,500
Parish registers
Crespino
Period
Population
Source
1819–1859
1,917
Parish registers
Casalguidi
Period
Population
Source
1762–1883
546
Parish registers
Madregolo
Period
Population
Source
1850–1869
31,000
Population registers
Venice (5 parishes)
Period
Population
Source
1834–1888
2,000
Population registers
Follina
Map 9.1
Location of the six Italian study populations
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Study Populations
Our study concerns six populations located in northern and central 
Italy (map 9.1). They include an urban population, a rural textile center, 
a mountain village, a village of farmers and day laborers, and two 
communities of sharecroppers, one located in a hilly area and the other 
on the plain. We therefore have a wide array of different socioeconomic 
and ecological conditions to deal with.
The urban population is a sample of the inhabitants of Venice, overall 
about 31,000 individuals, followed throughout different spells of their 
life course during the period 1850 to 1869. The sample includes the 
inhabitants of four different parishes of the city. There were large dif-
ferences in the population under study. The parishes of Angelo Raffaele 
and Santa Eufemia were by far the poorest of the city. Their inhabitants 
were mostly boatmen, fishermen, porters, and other unskilled day 
laborers. In Santa Eufemia, some men and women were also employed 
in small hemp factories. Several women from Angelo Raffaele worked 
in a large tobacco factory located nearby. In general, however, women 
carried out piecework at home, as bead-stringers, seamstresses, or hat- 
and glove-makers, or were employed as servants. San Geremia was 
predominantly a working-class parish. Men were mostly employed in 
glass factories, at the railway station, or as butchers at the communal 
slaughterhouse; women worked in glass factories, as milliners, or as 
servants. Finally, members of the elites, civil servants, employees, 
artists, artisans, and servants, especially females, inhabited San Luca, 
one of the richest parishes.
Overall, Venice was characterized by widespread poverty. After 
the fall of the aristocratic regime, in 1797, the city experienced a pro-
longed economic and demographic crisis (Zalin 1969). In a few years, 
its population fell from about 140,000 to less than 100,000 inhabitants, 
mainly due to massive outmigration. Borrowing a definition of early-
nineteenth-century Stockholm (Söderberg et al. 1991), we could simi-
larly label Venice as a “stagnating metropolis,” characterized by a crisis 
in the traditional manufacturing system, by the diffusion of an informal 
economic sector, and by a large population earning their living precari-
ously, teetering on the border of poverty. The demographic parameters 
clearly reflect the social and economic depression that characterized 
Venetian life. As late as 1881, Venice had by far the worst crude mortal-
ity rate among the 59 districts of the Veneto, with exceedingly high 
infant and childhood mortality rates (Derosas 1999b); on the other 
hand, fertility was among the lowest in the region, with a total fertility 
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rate of 3.30. As for marriage, the singulate mean age for women (SMAM) 
was 26.9, the oldest in the whole region. The proportions of unmarried 
people were also quite relevant, reaching 22.7 percent of women who 
never married in the age group 45 to 49 (Dalla Zuanna and Loghi 1997).
The second population is that of Treppo Carnico, a mountain village 
of about 1,100 inhabitants and 230 households on average, located in 
Carnia, in northeastern Italy. The local economy was based on intense 
seasonal emigration of adult men. In the mid-nineteenth century, the 
activities associated with such migration flows underwent a deep 
change, turning from peddlers and artisans into masons. During the 
transition between the two professional patterns—namely the period 
studied here—agriculture gained importance in seasonal migration, 
though it played a minor role in the local economy (Fornasin 1998). 
Treppo displayed the demographic features typical of the Carnia 
region. The growth rate was moderate (5.8 per thousand in 1834–1868); 
the life expectancy at birth was 39 years, while fertility was around 4.8 
children per woman. Treppo was therefore characterized by a low-
pressure demographic system, with late marriage and high levels of 
never-married inhabitants.
The third population included in the study is that of Follina, a textile 
center located in the Venetian countryside. Since the eighteenth century, 
Follina had been the main center for the wool industry in the Venetian 
state, and one of the most important in Italy. Founded primarily as a 
manufacturing agglomeration, it changed slowly into a residential 
settlement, becoming the site of a parish and a municipality in 1820. 
During the nineteenth century, Follina’s population grew from 1,200 to 
1,600 inhabitants. The population was neatly divided into textile 
workers and peasants. Textile workers constituted about 50 to 60 
percent of the total, mostly working in the local factories, though some 
carried out their job at home. Peasants made up around 20 to 30 percent 
and were mostly tenants. The remaining 20 percent was represented 
by a petty bourgeoisie of small landowners, shopkeepers, and profes-
sionals, and by a few entrepreneurs. In the 1850s the wool industry 
suffered a severe crisis, and the majority of the workers lost their job. 
The final shutdown came in the 1890s, and pushed many inhabitants 
to migrate to Brazil (Munno 2004).
The fourth population is that of Crespino, a village of 3,400 inhabit-
ants lying in the lowlands on the left side of the Po River, not far from 
the city of Ferrara. Its economy was exclusively rural, based on corn 
farming. There were a hundred farms of large dimensions, called 
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possessioni: they were usually around 30 hectares, and their exploitation 
required a workforce of considerable size, normally provided by the 
tenant’s household, the size of which could easily exceed 10 and even 
20 persons. Tenants resorted to laborers hired on a yearly base, although 
a certain number of servants were also present in their households. 
Other workers were hired by day, when fieldwork was particularly 
urgent. Day laborers were also employed in public works, especially 
in wintertime.
Finally, there are two sharecropping populations, Madregolo and 
Casalguidi. The norms regulating sharecropping were quite similar in 
the two villages. The sharecropping contract was normally made 
between the landowner and the head of a peasant household. The head 
was usually a man, and his role and duties gave him great authority 
and power over the other members of the household. The landowner 
provided the farm, the house, and the cow barn, while the sharecrop-
ping family provided labor and agricultural tools. The agricultural 
work was distributed among the household members according to age, 
sex, and individual ability. In both the communities the main concern 
of sharecroppers was to maintain a balance between resources and 
household size, which was accomplished through the adoption of spe-
cific demographic mechanisms, such as delayed marriage and the 
expulsion of family members. However, some relevant differences 
existed between Madregolo and Casalguidi, both in the social structure 
and in the environment.
Madregolo was a tiny village of 500 to 600 inhabitants in the low-
lands of the Po valley. The territory is flat and agriculture was the main 
activity, with wheat, legumes, grass, and hemp being the main prod-
ucts. According to a census from the mid-nineteenth century, 72 percent 
of the household heads were peasants, 19 percent were artisans, and 
the rest belonged to the lower middle class or the poor. Of the peasants, 
60 percent were sharecroppers and tenants, and the others were labor-
ers, either day laborers or laborers settled on a farm on a yearly agree-
ment. The backwardness of agriculture, the short length of sharecropping 
contracts, and the proximity to the city of Parma made the turnover 
quite intense: almost one-third of the population changed every year. 
The data for this village cover a period of more than a century, from 
1761 to 1883. During such a long period of time, the population expe-
rienced moments of sharp crisis, such as the typhus epidemic of 1817, 
and periods of relative population growth. Overall, the life expectancy 
at birth was around 35 and fertility was 5.6 children per woman.
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Casalguidi is a small country town on the outskirts of the city of 
Pistoia (Tuscany). Around the mid-nineteenth century, it had 2,500 
inhabitants and 460 households, some living in the village and some 
living in the surrounding countryside. Its economy was based on agri-
culture, which employed over 70 percent of the population. There were 
three main social groups in Casalguidi: landowners, artisans, and peas-
ants. All the agricultural workers fell into the last category, but there 
were several degrees of differentiation and stratification, though low-
income and needy families accounted for the majority. Most farmers 
were sharecroppers, some of whom were relatively rich. In Casalguidi 
the life expectancy at birth reached 35.3 years, and the fertility rate was 
5.3 children per woman.
Source Materials
Two different kinds of source materials were used for this study: popu-
lation registers on the one hand and a combination of parish registers 
and census-like listings called Status Animarum on the other. Popula-
tion registers are used for Venice, Follina, and Treppo, and parish 
registers for Crespino, Madregolo, and Casalguidi.
Population registers are a kind of longitudinal census. As with cen-
suses, population registers list people according to the households to 
which they belong, reporting information about personal and family 
names, the names of the parents, the place and date of birth, and the 
occupation of each member of the household. Population registers 
differ from censuses, however, since they record variations occurring 
through time. Therefore population registers allow the reconstruction 
of the biographies—or part-biographies—of individuals, framing them 
in the changing contexts of the families, households, and communities 
of which they were a part. Obviously population registers are not 
devoid of defects. There may be underreporting of events, especially 
the birth of infants who did not survive long enough to be recorded. 
Sometimes the dates reported are lacking or incomplete. In both cases, 
however, a double check on the vital events reported by the parish 
registers of the same areas made it possible to integrate and amend the 
data drawn from the population registers. A major drawback, for the 
purposes of this study, concerns household composition. It also happens 
that information on household composition and the related changes 
are not recorded properly. When two households merged, for example, 
the registrars did not usually bother to fill in a new form for the new 
domestic group, but simply filed the two old forms in the same place. 
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However, when a new conjugal unit was added to the household by 
virilocal or uxorilocal marriage, registrars sometimes preferred to fill 
in a new form rather than add the details of the new members to the 
old one, especially when there was little room left for that purpose. As 
a consequence the dynamics of living arrangements are difficult to 
follow and the information on household composition is not fully 
reliable.9
The other documentary sources used for this study were the parish 
registers of baptisms, burials, and marriages. The data drawn from the 
parish registers have been linked to the information on household 
composition reported yearly by the Status Animarum. The latter is a 
kind of census compiled by the parish priest before Easter. For each 
member of the household, the name, age, sex, marital status, and rela-
tionship to the head of the household, or to some other member of the 
family, are recorded. Since these records were made annually, it has 
been possible, with the help of supplementary data from vital registers, 
to reconstruct the life histories of all the individuals and families who 
were members of the three communities of Crespino, Madregolo, and 
Casalguidi in the period under study.
Unfortunately, in the cases of Crespino and Madregolo, the sources 
do not provide any information about the profession or socioeconomic 
condition of the individuals listed. Crespino’s Status Animarum, 
however, distinguish between households living on a large farm (pos-
sessione), in their own house, or in a rented one. We used such informa-
tion to distinguish farmers from the semi-landless, and the landless. 
Data on professions are reported in the case of Casalguidi; however, 
since most people were simply recorded as “peasants,” a category that 
pooled together the poor and the better-off, the information is quite 
equivocal. As a rule of thumb, we considered as sharecroppers those 
peasants who did not live in a house of their own. Also, in Treppo, the 
information on professions is rather poor and even lacking in 60 percent 
of the cases. We distinguished the remaining between “peasants” and 
“others.”
Descriptive Measures of Nuptiality
Table 9.2 displays some basic measures of nuptiality in the six popula-
tions under study. Overall, they clearly confirm the main features of the 
marriage patterns prevailing in nineteenth-century Italy, as they have 
been anticipated above. What is even more remarkable, such features 
were present in all the populations under study, notwithstanding the 
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differences in size, location, environment, and socioeconomic condi-
tions. First, access to marriage was rather late, the mean age at first 
marriage being around 27 to 28 years for males and 24 to 25 for females. 
Not unexpectedly, the villages in the Po Valley, Crespino and Madregolo, 
displayed the lowest age at marriage, both for males and for females, 
while Treppo lay on the upper bound of the range.
Second, the proportions of unmarried people were correspondingly 
high, though showing a greater variety: celibacy was highest in Venice, 
with around one-fourth of individuals aged 45 to 49 never marrying. 
The effect of the constraints of the mountain economy is also evident 
in Treppo, where around one-fifth of the population remained unmar-
ried. Again, Madregolo displayed the lowest values, with fewer than 
10 percent of men never marrying and an astonishing 2.1 percent of 
never-married women, which indeed seems quite exceptional.
As regards household structures, it is interesting to note that the 
number of complex households was rather high in all the populations, 
Table 9.2
Mean age at first marriage, proportions unmarried, and  residence in six Italian study 
populations, 1781–1888
Study 
population
Mean age at 
first marriage
Unmarried 
45–49 (%)
Multiple 
households 
(%)
Residing in a 
parental 
household after 
marriage (%)
Men Women Men Women   Men Women
Venice 
1850–1869
27.7 24.7 25.7 19.3 3.0 60a 27a
Follina 
1834–1888
28.4 24.9 10.0 13.3 14.5 64 3
Crespino 
1780–1789
25.2 22.9 12.4 12.1 18.8 68 4
Treppo 
Carnico 
1834–1867
29.5 27.0 22.9 19.2 19.4 59 7
Madregolo 
1761–1883
26.8 23.5 9.7 2.1 22.9 61 3
Casalguidi 
1819–1859
28.8 24.7 14.8 10.1 13.5 54 5
Sources: Our computations from local population registers, parish registers, and Status 
Animarum.
a. Percentage computed on marriages for which the address of the spouse’s parents is 
known.
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ranging from 12 to 23 percent. Coherent with the data on age at mar-
riage and proportions marrying, the share was larger in Madregolo. 
The urban population was the obvious exception; as explained above, 
however, this was partly due to registration practices. In all the popula-
tions considered, the majority of marriages did not give place to a new 
household, the new couple settling in the parental household of the 
bridegroom. The figure rose to 64 percent in Follina, but also in Venice, 
quite unexpectedly, the majority of marriages started with cohabitation 
with the husband’s parents. In Venice, furthermore, uxorilocal mar-
riages were also relatively numerous, 27 percent of the total, whereas 
they were quite rare in the rural communities.10 Overall, the share of 
neolocal marriages therefore ranged from 10 to 40 percent of the total. 
However, only some of such cohabitations with the parental household 
were permanent. In most cases, especially in Venice and Follina, they 
were rather a temporary solution, a kind of “launching pad” (Skinner 
1997: 62) adopted until the new couple could gather enough resources 
to settle on their own (Derosas 2003).
Table 9.3 displays the differences in timing of marriage by socioeco-
nomic status. Again, remarkable regularity emerges for the four popu-
lations for which information on the socioeconomic status (SES) is 
available, the better off marrying later than those on lower rungs of the 
social ladder. As far as males are concerned, the difference was 3.3 years 
in Venice, 2.3 in Casalguidi, and 3.4 in Follina. Females displayed 
similar behavior. In Crespino, however, the children of tenants’ families 
married much earlier than the others. There also seems to be a correla-
tion between the timing of marriage and the kind of settlement adopted 
by the new couple. In fact, as one would expect, those who remained 
in the parental household after marriage tended to marry earlier than 
those who abandoned it. This was true for both males and females, 
confirming that the choice of cohabitation could be instrumental in 
relaxing the economic constraints inherent in the settlement of a new 
household. Oddly enough, however, in Venice virilocal marriages were 
slightly later than neolocal ones.
Event-history Analysis of First Marriage
The previous section outlined several features of the marriage patterns 
prevailing in the six communities under study. Notwithstanding the 
differences in the ecological and socioeconomic context and in the 
household structures, all the populations displayed late access to 
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Table 9.3
Mean age at first marriage by sex, residential arrangements, and socioeconomic status 
in six Italian study populations, 1781–1888
Socioeconomic 
status
Men Women
Non-
virilocal Virilocal Total
Non-
uxorilocal Uxorilocal Total
Venice 27.3 29.1 27.7 24.6 26.5 24.7
Day laborer 26.6 28.3 27.0 24.2 24.8 24.2
Wage earner 27.2 29.6 27.8 24.3 27.0 24.6
Artisan, 
shopkeeper
27.6 27.2 28.2 24.0 (27.2) 24.1
Middle class 29.9 (30.1) 29.2 23.4 — 23.5
Follina 28.9 27.6 28.0 25.2 (24.3) 25.2
Peasant 28.9 26.6 27.2 23.3 (21.8) 23.3
Textile worker 28.8 27.5 27.9 26.4 (23.9) 26.3
Lower middle 
class
28.3 29.6 29.1 24.9 (21.4) 24.7
Landholder 30.7 28.9 29.5 25.7 (40.8) 26.0
Crespino 26.7 24.5 25.2 22.9 (22.0) 22.9
Farmer (22.1) 23.9 23.4 21.7 — 21.8
Other 27.9 24.7 25.7 23.2 (21.9) 23.1
Treppo Carnico 30.5 29.6 30.1 27.7 (29.1) 27.8
Peasant (28.3) (27.7) (28.1) 28.3 (26.7) 28.2
Other (28.2) (29.4) 28.9 27.5 (29.5) 27.6
Unknown 31.9 30.2 31.2 27.6 (29.5) 27.8
Madregolo. 28.4 25.7 26.8 23.6 23.2 23.5
Casalguidi 29.2 28.0 28.8 24.8 23.1 24.7
Day laborer 28.4 25.7 26.8 23.6 23.2 23.5
Sharecropper 28.5 28.0 28.1 25.2 23.1 24.9
Artisan 27.5 28.1 27.3 24.9 (22.9) 25.2
Other 28.6 28.4 28.2 25.0 23.3 24.8
Sources: See table 9.2.
Note: In brackets fewer than twenty cases.
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marriage, high proportions of unmarried inhabitants, and high fre-
quency of virilocal settlements after marriage. In addition there were 
differences in the timing of marriage according to the socioeconomic 
status of the spouses and the methods of family formation.
Statistical Methods
We turn now to a probabilistic approach, in order to highlight the 
factors that most affected the chances of marrying at the individual 
level. We followed the methods of event-history analysis: according to 
the nature of the information available, we adopted a discrete-time 
approach (logistic regression) in the cases of Madregolo, Casalguidi, 
and Treppo, and the semi-parametric method of Cox regression in the 
cases of Venice, Follina, and Crespino.11 In order to make comparisons 
possible, we ran discrete-time models using the c-loglog link, which 
makes the estimations almost equivalent to those of the continuous 
approach (Bengtsson and Broström 1997). In such models the depen-
dent variable is a dichotomous covariate indicating whether or not the 
individual experienced a first marriage either in a given year (discrete 
time) or within an infinitesimally small time interval (continuous time), 
provided that he or she was subject to the risk of experiencing it. It 
should be noted that insofar as the average age at marriage was similar 
across the various social groups, to some extent the differences in the 
relative risks can be interpreted as an indirect measure of the likelihood 
of permanent celibacy. The individuals at risk are all the never-married 
persons aged between 18 and 40 present in the populations under 
study. The independent variables are a set of factors whose effect on 
the hazard rate (or odds) was estimated. Such covariates can be either 
fixed or time-invariant (e.g., gender), subject to changes through time, 
or time-varying (e.g., the composition of the family).
Models
As mentioned above, our analysis assumed that all individuals desired 
to marry. We have mentioned already the substantive reasons support-
ing such a point of view. There are, however, also formal reasons in its 
favor. Indeed, if we assumed that the timing of marriage was primarily 
a matter of personal inclination and subjective feelings, this would 
make any modeling of marriage events hardly meaningful; needless to 
say, love and hormones are beyond our reach.
If one married later than others or did not marry at all, we interpret 
this as the outcome of constraints, or coercions, or a combination of the 
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two. Some constraints, however, could be relieved when other resources, 
mostly of a social kind, were available. A further, if secondary, assump-
tion is that all individuals would prefer to set up an independent 
household of their own, again if constraints or coercions would not 
oblige or push them to behave differently, joining another household 
upon marriage.12 The desire to marry and the preference for an inde-
pendent dwelling could have contrasting effects, though, encouraging 
or imposing patrilocal marriages, whereas neolocal marriages were 
discouraged or delayed.
Relying on such assumptions, we modeled the risk of marriage in 
the populations under study, taking into account a set of factors that 
could be interpreted as proxies for either constraints or coercions affect-
ing the “risk” of marriage. The factors included in our analyses can be 
gathered into the following four groups.
Economic Conjuncture
As a major constraint we considered the economic conjuncture, as 
expressed by the price level of food (corn or wheat). We identified as 
periods of economic stress those years during which the price was in 
the upper quartile of the overall distribution of the time periods 
under study. Since marriage required a certain amount of economic 
resources, we expected that when the conjuncture worsened and the 
price of food was high, people were pushed to delay or even give up 
a prospective marriage. Such was the case in modern England, where 
nuptiality turned out to be the demographic variable most sensitive 
to short-run changes in economic conditions, a doubling of food 
prices being associated with a decline in marriages in the same year 
by 41 percent, and a permanent loss of 22 percent on the normal 
annual total marriages (Schofield 2000: 59; see also Southall and 
Gilbert 1996 for the Victorian and Edwardian periods). Weir (1984a: 
39) found an even stronger effect for late-eighteenth-century France 
(see also Dupâquier 1979: 117–18). As for Italy, several studies carried 
out both at the aggregate level through time-series analyses and at 
the micro-analytic level confirmed the inverse relationship between 
prices and nuptiality (e.g., see Breschi et al. 2002, 2005, 2009; Fornasin 
2005; Fornasin et al. 2002; Scalone 2002). Our expectations were that 
such a discouraging effect should be stronger for the members of the 
lower social classes, as well as for neolocal marriages, which required 
more resources than patrilocal ones. For instance, Derouet (1980) 
showed that in eighteenth-century Thimerais (France), times of 
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economic stress affected the nuptiality of the day laborers but not of 
the peasants.
Socioeconomic Status
The most important coercive factor that we took into account is related 
to the household’s socioeconomic status. As Goody noticed, having to 
rely on aggregate statistics, Hajnal’s analysis understated “the impli-
cations regarding the class stratification of household systems, in par-
ticular their relation to resources” (1996: 7–8). Fertig (2005: 42–43) 
added that the model of society Hajnal had in mind was “tailored to 
a society of noble landowners, dependent peasant producers, a limited 
number of craftsmen, and servants,” assuming “the existence of a 
labor market only for unmarried, semi-free laborers,” which is “clearly 
unrealistic … for many parts of Western Europe, where day laborers, 
proto-industrial producers, and other sub-peasant strata were common 
during the early modern period as well as during the nineteenth 
century.”
However, just taking into account the variety of resources and the 
means available to gather them, as such criticisms recommend, also 
seems insufficient. Rather than the availability of viable niches, as 
implicit in Hajnal’s model, the specific polities of reproduction fol-
lowed by different social groups should be given priority. As Hen-
drickx (2005: 82–83) noticed, in many parts of modern Europe social 
groups occupying surplus producing niches “hardly increased or even 
decreased,” whereas “groups occupying marginal niches increased 
manifold.” Hendrickx drew from Viazzo (1989) and Ehmer (1991) the 
conclusion that what mattered in marital behavior was not the avail-
ability of viable niches but “the availability of specific social positions 
within a richly diversified social structure” (Ehmer 1991 quoted by 
Hendrickx 2005: 83). Indeed there is widespread evidence throughout 
Europe suggesting that access to marriage was inversely related to 
socioeconomic status (Alter 1991; Angeli 1990; Armstrong 1974: 165–66; 
Davidoff and Hall 1987: 222–23; Engelen and Kok 2003; Gozzini 1990; 
Kent 2002; Levine 1987; Lynch 1991: 89; Matthijs 2002; Morgan and 
Macafee 1984; Sovič 2008; van de Putte 2007; van Poppel 1993; van 
Poppel and Nelissen 1999). Interestingly, such a feature is still persis-
tent in contemporary societies, such as the United States: for instance, 
Axinn and Thornton (1992) found that in late-twentieth-century Detroit, 
both parental financial resources and parental educational attainment 
had additive delaying effects on the timing of marriage.
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
G
Lundh—Similarity in Difference
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Marriage and Social Reproduction in Italy 315
As table 9.3 shows, our own populations were no exception to this 
rule. Such a matter of fact seems at odds with a barely Malthusian 
perspective, but fits nicely with the coercions imposed by social repro-
duction. The larger the interests involved in a marriage, the deeper 
were the consequences expected for the families, and the more complex 
and cautious were its procedures. While economic constraints were 
probably most important at the lower rungs of the social ladder, differ-
ent forms of coercion became predominant as far as the better-off were 
concerned. It also seems reasonable to expect that the means of coer-
cion were more effective when the potential loss due to disobedience 
was greater, and when the assimilation of behavioral norms was 
enhanced by education and social control. On the one hand, as Sabean 
argued for nineteenth-century Neckarhausen, “the authority exercised 
by parents over adult children and the respect the latter were sup-
posed to demonstrate were both derived expressly from the fact that 
parents were the sources of wealth” (Sabean 1990: 416). On the other 
hand, Cavallo (2012) showed that in early modern Italian cities chil-
dren of artisans requested to be emancipated from the patria postestas 
on the pretension that their fathers were not able to carry out their 
economic obligations, such as settling them in a trade. In this way they 
were able to anticipate their entry in the labor market rather than con-
tributing with unpaid or underpaid labor to the family economy (see 
also Pfister 2004 for similar tensions among proto-industrial workers 
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Zürich). Indeed parents of the 
working classes could also be unwilling to lose the contribution of 
their adult children to the family budget (Alter 1988: 149; Spagnoli 
1983: 239). Klep (2005: 267) explained the late age at marriage in the 
poor areas of the Dutch countryside as being due to the stronger 
“power and need of the parents.” The children of the poor, however, 
had supposedly less to lose by following their own inclinations, even 
against parental will, provided that they had enough to support their 
new family (Seccombe 1993: 18; Shorter 1975: 261). Still the social 
stigma and the hostility of the kin network could be heavy costs to pay 
for independence. Among the better-off, breaking the family rules 
could have dramatic consequences for the well-being of the new couple 
and of their offspring.
The propertied classes were obviously the keenest to fit their mar-
riage policy into the main lines of their social reproduction strategies: 
this meant not only choosing suitable spouses for their children but 
also limiting the number of marriages to avoid asset dispersion through 
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inheritance and dowries (Bourdieu 1990: 187–99). Even the middle 
ranks of society could be affected by similar considerations: artisans 
and shopkeepers as well as farmers would keep their children at home 
as long as possible, in order not to lose their contribution to the family 
income and to avoid the expenses required by their marriage. In 
nineteenth-century Central and Western Europe, a new model of 
authoritarian and patriarchal family developed among the master arti-
sans, coinciding with the decline of the guild system. Business increas-
ingly became a family enterprise, and wives and children took the place 
of apprentices and hired journeymen. Interestingly, such a process was 
more intense at both extremes of the petite bourgeoisie. The richer 
trades compelled sons to stay at home in view of inheritance; the 
poorest ones, such as the food-producing, textile, and clothing trades, 
resorted to exclusively family workshops as a defensive response to 
economic crisis and competition from factories (Crossick and Haupt 
1995: 87–111; Ehmer 1984; Levine 1987: 112–13). Medick (1996, quoted 
by Fertig 2003: 12–13) found similar behaviors in the proto-industrial 
town of Laichingen (Württemberg), where the children of the poorest 
waivers often had to wait for their parents’ death to marry. Corre-
spondingly Sabean (1990: 426) showed that in nineteenth-century 
Neckarhausen, when the development of the market economy encour-
aged male outmigration, rural labor became increasingly a female 
occupation carried out by unmarried daughters.
Parents and Siblings
As the examples mentioned above clearly show, the social reproduc-
tion policies needed some coercive power to be enforced, and this was 
mainly provided by parental authority. This leads to the third group 
of variables included in our models. These variables concern the com-
position of the family, namely the presence and age of the parents as 
well as those of the siblings group. There is contrasting evidence 
regarding a supposed decline in parental authority in the nineteenth 
century. Complaints of contemporaries (Alter 1988: 143–44; Sabean 
1990: 321–33; Spagnoli 1983) should not be taken at face value. The 
studies mentioned above suggest on the contrary that the parental grip 
on children was strengthening rather than loosening. As Klep (2005: 
245) put it, “European parents had power.” If they were generally 
hostile to losing their children’s contribution and to supporting their 
marriage expenses, we expect that their own presence would affect the 
individuals’ chances of marrying negatively. In early modern America 
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the younger children had to defer their marriage until they could 
inherit their parents’ farm (Fawver 2012); as a consequence orphans 
married significantly earlier than the average (Smith 1973). Parents’ 
ability to retain their children was probably higher when the parents 
were relatively young and their authority was stronger, yet decreased 
with aging and possibly with widowhood (Smith 1973; see Axinn and 
Thornton 1992 for a contemporary example). Indeed retirement and 
widowhood might encourage the settlement of a new conjugal unit, 
in substitution for or support of the old one (Skinner 1997: 65). In our 
analyses we took aging into account, discriminating between parents 
under or over 60.
The size and composition of the siblings group could also represent 
a powerful source of constraint limiting the individual chances of mar-
riage. Although marriage is usually taken as a separate event, the posi-
tion of a child in the marriage market depends on the marriage chances 
of all the other siblings, his or her position in the sibling set, and the 
configuration of the latter (Bourdieu 1990: 197). In general, the larger 
the number of siblings in the family, the higher were the competition 
among them and the risk that some would have to give up and remain 
unmarried, in order not to weigh exceedingly on the family resources. 
We discriminated the position of the index individual according to the 
gender and age of the siblings.
Social Capital
Finally, we included a fourth group of variables to try to test whether 
the availability of social resources was capable of relieving the pressure 
of economic and family constraints, putting those who were better 
endowed in a favorable position in the marriage market. The partner-
ship with people embedded in extended networks would give access 
to a larger amount of social capital (Astone et al. 1999), for instance, 
making it easier to find a proper dwelling (Bodnár and Böröcz 1998; 
Derosas 1999a). Sabean (1998: 406–407, 449–89) stressed “the usefulness 
of kin,” arguing that not only the propertied classes but also the arti-
sans and the farm laborers relied heavily on kinship and the alliance 
system it provided. Reay (2002) made similar remarks about the Kent 
communities he studied, in which “independent” households were 
deeply embedded in dense kinship networks. Seccombe (1993: 32–33) 
argued that kin networks played a relevant role in protecting women 
looking for employment. Crossick and Haupt (1995: 106–107) under-
lined the importance of the extended family to the economic survival 
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of the petite bourgeoisie. Goody (1998: 57, 83–85) highlighted the role 
of extended kinship and affinal networks in the success of large eco-
nomic enterprises.
We used three different measures of the social capital available to 
individuals. One was the migrant status: we considered as such all 
those born outside the communities under study. Migrants are sup-
posed to have fewer and looser relationships within the local commu-
nity, and therefore to be less worthy in the marriage market. In several 
early modern and modern European cities, migrants tended to marry 
later than the native-born (see Lynch 1991: 84, for references; Ratcliffe 
and Piette 2007). A second measure was the extension of the kin 
network. Segalen (1991b) found that in early-nineteenth-century Nan-
terre, farmers with extended kinship networks married earlier than 
artisans who could not rely on kin support. We counted all kin (agnates 
and cognates up to the third degree) present in the location outside the 
household of the index individual, and used the logarithmic transfor-
mation of the total to account for nonlinearity. Finally, the third measure 
was an indicator of social relevance, as reflected by the frequency with 
which the other members of the study populations chose the individ-
ual’s parents as godparents. Unfortunately, we have been able to use 
this variable only for the village of Follina.
With the exception of socioeconomic and migrant status, all the 
covariates mentioned above are time-varying.
Results
Using this set of covariates, we ran several models for each popula-
tion, both pooling together all the individuals and separating males 
and females. In some cases we also ran separate (competing-risk) 
models for patrilocal marriages. As mentioned above, we expected 
that in patrilocal marriages some of the constraints affecting marriage 
could be relaxed, and coercion itself could work in the opposite direc-
tion, pushing toward rather than discouraging such a solution. Finally, 
we also ran interactions to test for possible joint effects between the 
household’s SES and the other covariates. All of this amounted to 
quite a large number of tables and figures, which cannot be com-
mented on in detail here. To make the overall picture easier to grasp, 
we restrict ourselves to an essential outline of the main results we 
obtained.
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Economic Conjuncture
Were the chances of marrying conditioned by the economic conjunc-
ture? This is the most direct test of whether some kind of Malthusian 
constraint was at work in the communities under study. Indeed such 
was the case in modern England (Schofield 2000) as well as in other 
European countries (Söderberg et al. 1991: 163–70). The situation in 
Italy seems less straightforward (table 9.4). A period of high prices for 
staple food had a negative impact on nuptiality in Follina and Casal-
guidi (though statistical significance is achieved only when all the 
marriages are collapsed together), no effect at all in Crespino and 
Madregolo, and a strong and weirdly positive effect in Venice and 
Treppo. It is worth noting that in Casalguidi the price effect was sig-
nificantly correlated with the household’s SES: indeed the interaction 
between the two covariates shows that the only group actually affected 
by a rise in the corn price was the day laborers, whose odds of marry-
ing were halved in times of economic stress, whereas all the other social 
groups remained apparently untouched. In Follina there was no sig-
nificant interaction between food price and SES. A possible explanation 
is that most of the small peasants could not achieve self-sufficiency and 
had to rely largely on the market for their basic provisions. In this 
respect they were similar to the textile workers and were equally sen-
sible to a worsening of the economic conditions. Furthermore, during 
economic crises, the peasant families used to push their unmarried 
youths to migrate to find alternative sources of income. Overall, the 
reduction in the risk of marriage when prices were high was around 
20 percent.
Regarding Crespino, it should be taken into account that at the time 
most day laborers were hired on a yearly basis by large capitalistic 
farms, with a fixed salary and the benefit of a small plot to work for 
their own subsistence. This kept them separated from the market con-
ditions, which they hardly bothered about: all they received and gave 
was entirely mediated by the farmer on whom they depended, the 
balance normally resulting in workers’ chronic indebtedness (Derosas 
1977). Actually the worst times for the day laborers were when prices 
were low, as in the long depression of the 1820s, when farmers were 
eager to reduce the workforce they employed.
What remains hard to explain is the effect of food prices in Venice 
and Treppo. In the period under study, Venice was affected by a few 
economic crises, the worst of which lasted from 1854 to 1857, when 
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the grain price doubled. This was beyond any doubt a terrible period 
for the populace, unemployment was widespread, and adult mortal-
ity soared due to a cholera epidemic, while a measles epidemic made 
many victims among children under five. There are signs that malnu-
trition was equally widespread, indirectly affecting neonatal mortal-
ity (Derosas 2009). Nevertheless, the risk of marriage in this period 
grew by 20 percent, a phenomenon as unexpected as worthy of 
further analysis. Certainly Lynch’s hypothesis that contrary to the 
situation in the countryside, “good times” in the cities tended to raise 
marriage ages temporarily by stimulating immigration (Lynch 1991: 
85) cannot be advocated here, since we are dealing with individual 
probabilities rather than with the average age at marriage, not to 
mention that the rural nature of the 1854 to 1857 crisis rather encour-
aged than discouraged immigration to the city from the countryside. 
Similarly in Treppo the even stronger positive impact of a period of 
high prices on nuptiality, especially for females, is against the expec-
tations: as mentioned above, in Treppo the consumption of food stuff 
largely exceeded its local production, so that a rise in food prices 
should lead to a worsening of living standards and an increase in 
temporary migration.
Socioeconomic Status
In all of the populations, the household’s SES was a powerful factor 
affecting the nuptiality of its members (table 9.5). If we compare the 
two extremes of the social scale, we find that the better off displayed a 
risk of marriage lower than that of the poorest group by 40 to 50 
percent. Only Crespino represents an interesting exception to the rule: 
indeed for the young farmers, the chances of marriage were much 
higher than for the landless and the semi-landless. This can be easily 
explained by the need to provide the farm with the necessary work-
force. Moreover most farmers’ marriages were patrilocal: the risk of a 
patrilocal marriage was 52 percent higher for the farmers than for the 
landless. The women who grew up in farmers’ families married quite 
early too; yet, whereas the women left the parental home upon mar-
riage to join the household of another farmer, the men remained at 
home with their new family. It is also worth noting that for farmers the 
risk of a male marriage rose dramatically when the share of adults in 
the total size of the household became unfavorable.
Being a male member of a sharecropping family in Casalguidi 
decreased the risk of marrying by 29 percent (in relation to the men 
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and women of the middle class, their chances of marrying were even 
lower). Similarly to Crespino’s farmers, men in sharecropping house-
holds were discouraged from leaving the family; differently from Cres-
pino, however, the landlords did not appreciate having complex 
households running their farms, and pressed the family to avoid or 
delay any marriage that could alter the desired balance in the house-
hold composition. The contradiction is only apparent, though. In both 
cases marriage was molded to answer the needs of social reproduction: 
in Crespino, by securing the family workforce in an area of extensive 
farming and low population pressure; in Casalguidi, by keeping the 
right balance in an area where farming was intensive and the popula-
tion pressure high.
However, even where households could not be as clearly featured 
as units of production, such as in Follina and Venice, the social divide 
remained quite relevant. In Follina, the strong difference in the risk of 
marriage of textile workers in comparison with that of the small peas-
ants can be easily understood as the desire to keep the children’s con-
tribution to the family earnings as long as possible. For Venice as well, 
the hazards of marriage lowered steadily according to social rank. Only 
the wageworkers did not display statistically significant differences 
from the day laborers, whereas the decline was respectively 21 and 58 
percent for the artisans and shopkeepers, and the members of the 
middle class. As for females, there were similar though lesser differ-
ences: −16 (artisans) and −26 (middle class) percent, respectively. 
Finally, in Treppo, the socioeconomic conditions seem to have affected 
particularly the female population, delaying dramatically the marriage 
of female peasants in comparison with the members of the landless 
families.
Parents
We turn now to a different point of view, taking into account the com-
position of the family and how it affected the chances of marrying. As 
mentioned above, we assumed that the requirements of social repro-
duction also included aspects such as the intergenerational relationship 
between parents and children. The effects of the parental condition on 
the marriage of children could be contrasting, though. On the one 
hand, the grasp of parents on their children could relax with aging, 
making an exit for marriage more likely. On the other hand, old parents, 
who were possibly widowed, would require some assistance condi-
tioning the marital choice of one child at least. This could involve either 
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delaying an exit for marriage or giving it up definitively, or favoring 
the arrangement of a patrilocal marriage (Skinner 1997: 65–66).13
Our results show that the negative impact was largely prevalent. We 
considered separately the presence and the age—below or above 60—of 
both parents. Overall, we found that such covariates had an extremely 
heavy impact on the individual’s risk of marrying, confirming our 
assumption about the importance of parental coercion for their chil-
dren’s destiny (table 9.6).
Nevertheless, some further specifications are in order. In Casalguidi, 
what mattered more was the old age of the parents, raising the chances 
of a marriage in the family by 85 and 45 percent for males and females, 
Table 9.6
Event-history analysis of the relative risk of first marriage: effects of current grain prices 
in six Italian study populations, 1781–1888
Current grain 
price
Men Women
Relative risk p-value Relative risk p-value
Venice
Lower 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Higher 1.15 0.023 1.26 0.00
Follina
Lower 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Higher 0.80 0.07 0.82 0.08
Crespino
Lower 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Higher 1.01 0.60 0.98 0.38
Madregolo
Lower 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Higher 0.83 0.44 0.832 0.36
Treppo Carnico
Lower 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Higher 1.28 0.26 1.67 0.01
Casalguidi
Lower 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Higher 0.76 0.25 0.73 0.16
Sources: See table 9.2.
Note: Cox regression estimates for Venice, Follina and Crespina; complementary log-log 
estimates for Madregolo, Treppo Carnico, and Casalguidi. In the multivariate models the 
risk of first marriage is regressed on the socioeconomic status of the household, grain 
prices (corn or wheat), presence and age of the parents and siblings and indicators of 
“social capital.” The complementary log-log model also controls for age.
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respectively. This leaves open the question of whether such marriages 
were motivated by a weakening of parental authority or rather by the 
need to replace the parental couple once the age for retirement was 
reached, and possibly one of the two had passed away. The first hypoth-
esis would turn out to be quite disruptive for social reproduction, 
whereas the second would be a conservative one. Unfortunately, no 
straightforward answer is possible. Analyzing patrilocal and neolocal 
marriages separately (tables not reported here), we find that a “weak-
ness” of the parental couple, meaning that the parents were old and 
possibly widowed, had a tremendous and positive impact on the likeli-
hood of a male marriage in the family both for neolocal and patrilocal 
marriages. The difference was somehow stronger for the former, but 
was also quite relevant to the patrilocal ones. The only difference con-
cerned the patrilocal marriage when both parents were absent. On the 
one hand,  this condition made an exit for marriage three times more 
likely in comparison with what happened when both parents were 
present and “young,” the chances of marrying and staying in the 
household were reduced by half. On the other hand, if the mother was 
an “old” widow, the chance of a male patrilocal marriage was raised 
by 78 percent.
Interestingly, not only Madregolo, the other sharecropping location, 
but also the other populations included in our study display very 
similar results, notwithstanding the diversity of their socioeconomic 
structure. In Treppo, such an effect was extremely strong: a fatherless 
individual was 3.5 times more likely to marry than one living with a 
young father. The absence of the mother raised a woman’s chances of 
marrying by 5.5 times. In Crespino, it was the father’s absence that 
made both males and females much more likely to marry. In Follina, 
both the old age and the absence of the father raised the chances of 
marrying by 38 (females) to 59 (males) percent. As for the mother, her 
absence affected in an even stronger way (+84 percent) the marriage 
chances of sons, but not those of daughters, who were probably 
expected to take the mother’s place as housewives and caregivers. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Follina, we are not able to discriminate 
between neolocal and patrilocal marriages, though patrilinearity 
seemed largely prevalent. For Venice, however, it was possible to dis-
tinguish among the different purposes for which a marriage could be 
used. Indeed, in the Venetian case, the age of the parents did not seem 
to matter, but their absence mattered greatly, for both parents and both 
sexes, raising the risk of marriage by about 20 percent. Such an aspect 
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was, however, dramatically enhanced in the case of virilocal or uxorilo-
cal marriages, and much more so when daughters were concerned: 
living with a widowed parent raised the likelihood of a virilocal 
arrangement by 2.3 times, and by 5.4 (with a widowed father) to 6.5 
(with a widowed mother) times for an uxorilocal one (tables not dis-
played). To put things more simply, whenever the parental couple was 
broken, one of the children, preferably a daughter, was prompted to 
reconstitute a conjugal unit in the household. Even in an urban setting, 
and possibly more so than in the countryside, the attitude toward a 
long-lasting intergenerational relationship was a basic tenet of familial 
and social relations, which explained the frequency of extended house-
hold arrangements (Goody 1998: 89–90; Seccombe 1993; Stavenuiter 
1996). Not unexpectedly, it was the daughters who were primarily 
appointed to this role (Derosas 2003; on daughters’ role, see Skinner 
1997: 68).
Siblings
Siblings could represent a further constraint to marital choices. Families 
with many children might think better of letting only a few of them 
marry, so as not to spoil their resources exceedingly. Furthermore, in 
certain communities, setting up too many marital alliances could be a 
source of embarrassment for the social relations of the families involved 
(Bourdieu 1976). Indeed, with remarkable homogeneity, our communi-
ties displayed the same effects of the siblings group composition (table 
9.7). Everywhere the presence of older siblings in the family reduced 
the chances of marrying dramatically, roughly by about one-half. Inter-
estingly, this concerned both males and females, regardless of the 
gender of the siblings considered, although of course the effect was 
stronger when the gender was the same as that of the individual at risk. 
However, being the eldest in the sibling group had a positive effect on 
the risk of marriage in Casalguidi (for both males and females), Follina 
(for males), and Crespino (for females). In Venice the presence of any 
sibling reduced dramatically the likelihood of a patrilocal marriage, 
both for males and for females (tables not displayed). Although the 
combination of such effects might seem to point out some mechanisms 
of seniority (as in Kertzer and Hogan 1991)—meaning that the eldest 
married earlier—that would not be a correct interpretation, since the 
comparison was not carried out with the siblings of the same family, 
but with individuals in other families who were in a different position 
in their own siblings group. It seems therefore more appropriate to 
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Table 9.7
Event-history analysis of the relative risk of first marriage: effects of socioeconomic status 
in six Italian study populations, 1781–1888
Socioeconomic 
status
Men Women
Relative risk p-value Relative risk p-value
Venice
Day laborer 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Wage earner 0.90 0.12 1.03 0.71
Artisan 0.79 0.01 0.84 0.04
Middle class 0.42 0.00 0.76 0.10
Follina
Peasant 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Textile worker 0.80 0.06 0.54 0.00
Middle class 0.61 0.00 0.56 0.00
Crespino
Landless 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Semi-landless 1.02 0.90 0.97 0.82
Farmer 1.41 0.04 1.36 0.11
Other 1.29 0.40 1.19 0.52
Treppo Carnico
Peasant 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Other 0.68 0.20 1.82 0.01
Unknown 0.65 0.08 0.28 0.00
Casalguidi
Day laborer 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
Sharecropper 0.76 0.02 0.96 0.72
Peasant 0.75 0.06 1.29 0.06
Artisan 1.01 0.92 1.05 0.71
Middle class 0.38 0.04 0.61 0.07
Sources: See table 9.2.
Notes: See the notes of table 9.4 for specification of the models.
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consider such results as the effect of constraints (or of coercion exer-
cised through parental intervention) affecting the chances of ever 
marrying at all.
Social Capital
Our final point concerns a resource rather than a constraint to marriage. 
The question we asked is whether the network of social relations in 
which families were embedded—which we label as “social capital”—
could enhance the chances of marriage of their members, reducing the 
strength of the hindrances or coercions taken into account thus far. This 
is coherent with our general framework, since the maintenance and 
extension of social relationships was certainly a primary concern of 
social reproduction. We used three different proxies for social capital, 
some of which unfortunately are not available for all the populations 
under study: these were the immigrant status of the index individual, 
the size of the kinship network, and the social prestige. The latter was 
proxied by the number of times the parents of the index individual had 
been chosen as godparents in baptism ceremonies (table 9.8).
Actually migrant families did not seem disadvantaged in the mar-
riage market. Interestingly, however, this concerned communities in 
which immigration and turnover were quite intensive: indeed in 
Follina, Madregolo, and Casalguidi, migrants constituted 40 to 60 
percent of the population at risk. In Venice, on the contrary, migrants 
made up just above 10 percent of the total and were less likely to 
marry than their indigenous counterparts, by 17 and 32 percent for 
males and females, respectively. Lynch (1991: 83) argued that the 
high proportions of migrants were the single most important factor 
explaining “the exaggerated version of the European Marriage Pattern” 
displayed by early modern urban populations. Actually, as our popu-
lations show, intra-rural mobility could be more intense than migra-
tion to cities. Somehow, unexpectedly, Venice was itself a rather 
isolated location in the nineteenth century, ranking in the bottom 
place among the largest Italian cities both for migration rates and for 
nuptiality rates (Derosas 2002: 726). Nevertheless, our results seem to 
confirm Lynch’s remarks, insofar as the urban population displayed 
greater hostility to strangers, possibly perceiving them as competitors 
for scarce resources, although their number was quite small (Derosas 
1999a; Hannerz 1980).
Such an impression is reinforced by the analysis of the influence of 
kinship networks on access to marriage. In all the populations except 
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those of Crespino and Treppo, we were able to trace and count all the 
kin to the index individual up to the third degree, who were present 
throughout time, including both agnates and cognates. In the three 
rural communities, the extension of the kin network did not exert any 
influence on the chances of marriage. In Venice, on the contrary, this 
turned out to be quite strong, an increase by one unit in the logged 
number of kin raising the hazards of marriage by 38 to 69 percent. In 
practice, this means that, all other things being equal, the chances of a 
neolocal marriage for men in the upper quintile of the kin distribution 
(from 22 kin up to 130) were from 3.5 to 7 times higher than those in 
the lower quintile (who had fewer than 6 kin).
Our final point regards the social prestige of the family, which we 
have been able to approximate only for Follina through the frequency 
with which its members were chosen as godparents in baptism ceremo-
nies. Indeed this represented a major way to establish an alliance 
among the families involved (Munno 2005, 2006, 2008). Our findings 
were consistent with the expectations: the children of the families 
chosen most frequently were significantly more likely to be married, 
in a measure varying from by 37 to 77 percent. Munno (2009: 336) also 
showed that the members of families who preferred to choose their 
godparents from within their own kin group were significantly less 
likely to marry than the members of families whose social relations 
were more open.
Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of our study was to propose a framework for the inter-
pretation of the Italian conundrum of family systems and marriage 
patterns. However, we had no ambition to dig a new grave in the 
Italian burial ground of family theories evocated by Kertzer (1991b). 
We believe that looking for any further comprehensive model would 
be a hopeless task. Similarly to the rest of Italy, our six populations 
display a puzzling variety of combinations, though sharing some basic 
patterns, such as relatively late ages at marriage, high percentages of 
people who never married, and, interestingly, a large number of patrilo-
cal settlements. These shared features are not enough, however, to force 
such patterns into a comprehensive model—whether or not we name 
it “Mediterranean”—to place side by side with the illustrious one out-
lined for Northwest Europe by Hajnal (1965; 1982) and validated by 
Wrigley and Schofield (1981) for modern England.
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Leaving classificatory problems aside, our interpretative framework 
pointed out social reproduction as the main organizing principle of 
family arrangements. We argued that if the larger background of social 
organization were not taken into account, the mechanisms governing 
family life would remain largely obscure. If marriage was primarily a 
matter of economic resources, how come the members of the upper 
classes were those who married less and later? Malthus provided a 
hedonistic explanation: the rich refrained from marrying in order not 
to give up such pleasures as the “illicit intercourse” they could easily 
indulge in as long as they remained unmarried (Malthus 1826: 397). 
Notwithstanding its modern flavor, such a position ignores the coercive 
component embedded in such an attitude, ending up dangerously 
close to a culturalist explanation. Also the Venetian nobles publicly 
declared their dislike for marriage (to which they were not allowed 
by their families) but resorted frequently to secret marriages, which 
were silently accepted since they brought no political or patrimonial 
consequences for the families involved (De Biase 1992; Hunecke 1997). 
In the vacuum following the fall of the Republic, when the political 
coercions inspiring marriage strategies suddenly became meaningless, 
love marriages (and divorces) seemed to triumph, but it was a short 
parenthesis and more compelling class considerations soon prevailed 
again (Derosas 1997).
There is no doubt that cultural values could drive marital behavior 
forcefully (Bourdieu 1976), but the kind of material and political inter-
ests they served remain to be explained. Our approach avoided both 
cultural and economic explanatory frameworks. To be sure, the 
economy had an enormous influence on family organization, but it 
should not be the only issue to take into account. Kertzer was certainly 
right in advocating the inclusion of political economic forces in the 
analysis of household history (Kertzer 1991a: 164–65). Interestingly, 
he supported his argument with examples from Eastern Europe. The 
Italian case might have offered examples as pertinent to his purpose as 
the East European ones: the distribution of landownership, the struc-
ture of farms, the juridical forms set up for their exploitation, and the 
conditions of the workforce were the outcome of historical processes, 
in which politics mattered at least as much as the economy. Such pro-
cesses, for instance, together with the peculiar environmental settings, 
led to the deeply different ways in which farming was organized in 
Tuscany, Emilia, and the Veneto. As Sabean (1990: 427) put it, “families 
have to be understood within a field of power.”
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If the Italian family system appears so hopelessly complex, this is 
dependent on the multiplicity of political, economic, and social orga-
nizations in which it was framed. Albeit in different ways, all family 
arrangements were functional in their reproduction. Securing a regular 
and smooth reproduction of social structures required tight and con-
tinuous control over family organization, and above all over the way 
in which marriages were managed. This was carried out through a 
complex and continuous interplay of factors of coercions and hin-
drances. As Bourdieu (1976: 140) put it, “the constraints surrounding 
every matrimonial choice are so numerous and appear in such complex 
combinations that the individuals involved cannot possibly deal with 
all of them consciously, even if they have mastered them on a different 
level.”
Much less so can we pretend to accomplish such a task. Neverthe-
less, we pointed out some factors of coercion and constraints molding 
marital behavior, mostly of a socioeconomic or demographic nature. 
These included the economic conjuncture, the socioeconomic status of 
the family, its composition, and the social capital upon which families 
could rely. Overall, the sensitivity of nuptiality to the current economic 
conditions, which was shown to be the pillar of the homeostatic regula-
tions of population growth in England, turned out to be quite weak in 
our case studies, and limited to those social groups that were more 
exposed to the market conditions.
Regardless of the economic conjuncture, socioeconomic status was 
nonetheless a very strong factor differentiating access to marriage. In 
all of our populations such access was inversely related to the social 
gradient, a result that could hardly be explained unless within the logic 
of social reproduction and its coercive power, which was primarily 
committed to parental control. The only relevant, and revealing, excep-
tion to the rule that the better-off married later and less frequently was 
that of Crespino’s tenant farmers. In an area of extensive farming and 
low population density, the need for a stable and rather large workforce 
was met by resorting to the early patrilocal marriage of sons, giving 
place to large, complex households, and the circulation of daughters 
among other tenants’ families. It is hardly surprising that, in this 
respect, Crespino displayed the same features as those characterizing 
the large estates of the Baltic provinces (Plakans and Wetherell 2005), 
like any other area with extensive farming (e.g., see Gunnlaugsson and 
Guttormsson 1993), as Hajnal himself suggested (Hajnal 1965: 133–34). 
A similar situation probably characterized the sharecropping area of 
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Madregolo, though unfortunately we cannot put forward direct evi-
dence in relation to this. On the contrary, where agriculture was inten-
sive and demographic pressure high, as in Casalguidi, sharecroppers 
were forced to follow a different policy of late marriage and frequent 
celibacy in order to maintain their social status. As Viazzo (2005: 146) 
argued, “in spite of retaining a joint-family system, [the Tuscan share-
croppers] were able progressively to delay—and restrict—marriage … 
precisely because they wanted to remain sharecroppers” (Viazzo’s italics). 
Although in the Tuscan system the coercive power of the landlords 
played a decisive role, we should not overstate it. Indeed similar mar-
riage patterns could be found among the olive- and wine-grower fami-
lies in the Kingdom of Naples studied by Delille (1985). In this case the 
authority over marriages was not exercised by the landlord but by the 
collective interests of the kin group ruling over the quartier lignager. In 
the end, both purposes and outcomes were basically the same.
As these examples show, social reproduction was secured through 
the ways that most suited the demographic and environmental condi-
tions of different areas. Overall, the ultimate concern for controlling 
marital behavior was the need to keep the demographic growth in line 
with the economic opportunities. Admittedly, this might sound like a 
refurbishment of the Malthusian approach. The point is, however, that 
families did not care about the overall balance between population 
pressure and economic resources. They did care about maintaining 
their well-being and social standing and tried to behave correspond-
ingly. Homeostasis was rather the (unintentional) outcome of the 
(intentional) pursuit of social reproduction.14
Obviously this was not always the case, though. In nineteenth-
century Piedmont, marriage control did not prevent the fragmentation 
of family plots, jeopardizing the self-sufficiency of textile workers and 
making them more susceptible to the crises in the manufacturing sector 
(Ramella 1984). On the contrary, the Venetian aristocracy was almost 
completely extinguished as a consequence of its stubborn restriction of 
marriages to avoid asset dispersion (Hunecke 1997). Similarly the 
demographic crisis in the late seventeenth century compelled the Nea-
politan populations studied by Delille (1985) to abandon their ultra-
conservative polity, opening up to female inheritance and acceptance 
of strangers. In other cases socioeconomic changes made coercive 
powers less effective. Since the 1870s the Po plain where Crespino lies 
has been involved in a deep reorganization of farming units and man-
agement, turning almost exclusively to daily-hired labor for the 
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Table 9.10
Event-history analysis of the relative risk of first marriage: effects of “social capital” in 
six Italian study populations, 1781–1888
Indicators of “social 
capital”
Men Women
Relative risk p-value Relative risk p-value
Venice
Immigrant
 No 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
 Yes 0.83 0.04 0.68 0.00
Kin (logged) 1.69 0.00 1.38 0.00
Follina
Immigrant
 No 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
 Yes 1.10 0.36 1.02 0.76
Kin (logged) 1.05 0.26 0.96 0.36
Times as godparents
 0 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
 1–3 1.54 0.00 1.37 0.01
 4+ 1.77 0.00 1.63 0.00
Madregolo
Immigrant
 No 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
 Yes 0.82 0.20 1.03 0.87
Kin (logged) 0.98 0.33 1.01 0.54
Casalguidi
Immigrant
 No 1.00 ref. 1.00 ref.
 Yes 1.06 0.56 0.95 0.52
Kin (logged) 1.01 0.52 1.00 0.75
Sources: See table 9.2.
Notes: See the notes of table 9.4 for specification of the models.
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fieldwork. This was reflected by a rise in nuptiality among the day 
laborers, which they later paid for with structural unemployment and 
massive emigration to America. This process was also accompanied by 
widespread complaints about a loss of authority at all the social levels 
and a lack of obedience by the youths (Derosas 2003). Yet the sharecrop-
ping system turned out to be remarkably stable through time (Breschi 
1990). In the period under study, the population of Casalguidi grew by 
41 percent, and the number of households by 34 percent. However, 
while the households of the day laborers tripled, those of the sharecrop-
pers grew by only 14 percent.
Although we have focused here on the Italian case, we believe that 
the principles of social reproduction shaped marriage and family pat-
terns in all societies. Obviously we do not argue that such principles 
were the same everywhere, or that all societies tended to remain 
unchanged through time. On the contrary, there was a strict relation-
ship between the dynamism of societies and the corresponding changes 
in family patterns. Many essays and books have been written arguing 
that the peculiar family system that prevailed in northwestern Europe 
was at the origin of European capitalism and the Industrial Revolution 
(e.g., see De Moor and van Zanden 2010; Foreman-Peck 2011; Hartman 
2004; Jones 2003; Levine 1987; Macfarlane 1986). We suggest that such 
a relationship between family systems and socioeconomic develop-
ment should also be viewed the other way around: “family formations 
reproduce social formations; equally, social formations are reproduced 
by family formations” (Levine 1987: 215). Bourdieu (1990: 189) argued 
that it was the failures in the reproductive mechanisms, such as mar-
riage misalliances, sterility, and asset partition, which represented the 
main factors of transformation of the economic and social hierarchy. 
Correspondingly conservative and stationary societies, characterized 
by long-term economic stagnation, hostility toward innovation, and 
preference for rent-seeking positions, found a fundamental pillar in the 
social reproduction guaranteed by the family system that most befitted 
their functioning.15
Notes
1. We rely here on Viazzo’s (2003, 2005) insightful reappraisals of the scholarly debate 
on the Hajnal hypothesis and the family in Southern Europe.
2. More recently a growing number of studies has questioned the validity of Hajnal’s 
representation also for Eastern Europe, arguing that family systems were much more 
heterogeneous than they have been assumed for a long time, and that Hajnal’s view was 
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biased by ideological prejudices. See, for instance, Čapo Žmegač (1996), Sovič (2008), 
Szołtisek and Zuber-Goldstein (2009), Gruber and Szołtisek (2012), and Szołtisek (2012). 
Kaser (2002) supports instead the traditional view of a patriarchal Eastern Europe. Todd 
(2011: 48) harshly dismisses Hajnal’s model as “une classification simplifiée et absurde 
opposant la nucléarité de l’ouest de l’Europe au communitarisme de l’est, dans une 
typologie mort-née qui restera sans doute la grande contribution de la guerre froide à 
l’anthropologie.”
3. See Viazzo (2003, 2005: 137–41) for a review. On the ideological roots of the “Italian 
vices,” see Patriarca (2010).
4. See the chapters by Wolf; Chuang and Wolf; Engelen and Wolf; Klep, in Engelen and 
Wolf (2005).
5. In Verdon’s definition, culturalism “is a type of explanation which consists in observ-
ing a patterned behaviour or a collective practice, and in accounting for its existence by 
invoking a set of norms or of values, dictating this practice. In other words, it consists 
in summoning Culture (not specific cultural facts, but general norms, beliefs or a general 
ethos, that is, some floating, hypostatized and transcendental entity) to explain the fact 
that most individuals in a population act in a certain way in certain circumstances …” 
(Verdon 1998: 21–22).
6. Biagioli (2002) provided impressive evidence of the landlords’ tight control of share-
cropping families.
7. Though widely shared, such viewpoints have their opponents. Guinnane (1991) 
argued that in the early twentieth century permanent celibacy became increasingly 
attractive to the Irish and alternatives like living with siblings or using property or 
the Poor Law for future risk aversion were preferred to the burdens of marriage and 
child-rearing. Klep (2005) suggested that in the Netherlands in the late nineteenth 
century young people would rather postpone marriage to delay the loss of income 
associated with the switch of young women from the condition of paid workers to 
that of unpaid mothers. Somehow contradictorily, however, he also assumed that 
parents prevented their children from marrying because they needed their help. 
Schellekens (1991) argued that Dutch (and possibly Northwest European) laborers 
preferred to postpone marriage, since they could enjoy of a relative degree of premari-
tal sexual freedom.
8. Levine 1987 represents a noteworthy exception.
9. In the Venetian case, we used information about the addresses to establish patterns 
of co-residence: when two households dwelled at the same address and moved at the 
same time, it seems quite reasonable to infer that they did live together. In practice, in 
the following analysis, two persons were considered as members of the same household 
when they were listed on the same “household-form” or when they were relatives living 
at the same address for the time spell considered, though they might be recorded on 
separate forms.
10. These percentages refer to the share of patrilocal marriages in the number of mar-
riages for whom the address of one of the spouse’s parents at the time of marriage is 
known. The frequency of patrilocal arrangements in Italy was postulated by Laslett 
(1983a) and confirmed by Kertzer and Hogan (1991). For a Dutch urban example, see 
Janssens (1993), and for a general overview see Kertzer (2002).
11. See Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995) for an introduction.
GLundh—Similarity in Difference
PROPERTY OF THE MIT PRESS
   FOR PROOFREADING, INDEXING, AND PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
342 R. Derosas, M. Breschi, A. Fornasin, M. Manfredini, C. Munno
12. To some extent, our approach may appear as an extension of Verdon’s “atomistic set 
of axioms for Western residence” (Verdon 1998: 47–71). Verdon did not include marriage 
in his analysis, preferring to focus exclusively on residential patterns. We added the 
access to, and timing of, marriage to his approach, as the first and most important event 
regulating the subsequent living arrangements. Also Daniel Scott Smith (1993) assumed 
that the neolocal residence is a “natural” choice for young couples. Emmanuel Todd’s 
(2011) ambitious reconstruction of the origins of family systems argues that the nuclear 
family was the most primitive familial structure in human history. In this regard, the 
English were as archaic and peripheral as the Bushmen, the Andamaneses and the 
Nambikwara.
13. Skinner (1997: 65) also suggested that in patrilineal stem-family systems, widows or 
widowers might have been at a disadvantage in seeking a daughter-in-law for the heir 
designate, and that orphaned young men appeared less attractive in the marriage market.
14. In a similar vein, Lesthaeghe (1980: 530) argued that “demographic homeostasis is 
not a feature that stands on its own and needs explanation sui generis by inventing a 
special concept such as ‘unconscious rationality’; rather it is a logical ingredient in 
a broader homeostasis relating to the entire social system.” See also Fertig (2003).
15. See also McNicoll’s remarks: “An exploration in functional terms—seeing particular 
structures as, for example, devices for maintaining power positions or diffusing risk—is 
an important source of insight into socio-economic stasis in a changing environment” 
(McNicoll 1978: 89, quoted by Lesthaeghe 1980: 548). A convincing reassessment of the 
economic consequences of the persistence of “amoral familism” in Italy and the corre-
sponding deficit of social capital is available in Alesina and Ichino (2009).
